offers the demise of the GDR, the historically unique opportunity for in-depth insight into the quality and quantity of work of a modern intelligence service in general and in its industrial espionage to get in particular.
The transferability of the results to other countries is limited by the fact that
a) states, the conduct economic espionage today, so with different intensity and other details (especially technical) to do when the GDR before 1989 and
b) characterized industrial espionage by competitors naturally also through other ways and intensity.
;
Yet There is, first parallels, what principles, techniques, basic knowledge interests and the difficulty of utilizing information retrieval and concerns analysis and secondly, one can conceive of economic espionage in the GDR because of their undoubted quality and quantity, except for its technical capabilities as a worst case scenario for the target of attack ( eg with respect to resources, access to society, politics and business, the range of options and motivation of leaders).
relevance of economic espionage in the GDR
Although the interest is surprisingly low in the industrial espionage of the GDR - in contrast to the interest in espionage against the West German policy or against the media and the military and their own services - is among the experts this range hardly denied that the Stasi worked with a hand-to overwhelmingly excellent intelligence quality. For them, not only society but also political, military and even the economy of the Federal Republic, "an open book" as Muller-Enbergs formulated that successfully infiltrated. Whether the implementation of their findings successful, is another question.
Main Intelligence Directorate (HV A) established in 1989 over 3,300 full time employees, over 700 officers in special uses and as many full-time employees Unofficial (IM). Of the 15 per cent were set on the government, 14 percent to the parties, 25 percent to the military and as many as 52 percent on economic issues (13 percent biology, energy, chemicals, 17 percent of electronics and electrical engineering, 22 percent engineering and embargo goods) . The sector Science and Technology (SWT), the HV A established in 1989 over 400 people and there was also industrial espionage in particular in the form of procurement Stasi by other organizational units and the area of Commercial Coordination (KoKo) instead.
The questions of who was spying for the Stasi as an IM or an officer on special assignment (OIB) and how and why these people were active today clarified. Contrary to popular belief commonly only 7 percent of the agents were introduced into the Federal Republic, 6 percent were - as a business visitor from the West - addressed at the Leipzig Fair and won, 11 percent were as travelers from the East limited in the Federal Republic of active and 58 percent were recruited on the recommendation already active IM.
The motivation was at 60 percent of the IM, the conviction at 27 percent of material interests, at 7 percent personal constraints (eg extortion with incriminating material) and at 4 percent, the false pretenses (for example, gave themselves the agents of the German Democratic Republic as members of Western services).
The Stasi turned on object studies to companies and institutions, and in 1989 invaded in about 150 companies and institutions in the Federal Republic. It shows the files that as many as 85 sources provided documents from Siemens, with apparently only 8 sources at Siemens were automatic. The analysis was conducted by approximately 184 employees in a central evaluation unit, including scientists with access to current literature and congresses.
experience reports such as that of full-time employee A-HV Hans Eltgen show that industrial espionage even with appropriate training of agents (Eltgen was a physicist and intelligence officer) without direct access to target organizations not as good as is possible. Eltgen promoting agents out of conviction, against payment of money or because of personal reasons (eg the intention of the alleged son of the late best friend to lead to more work) to.
The example computer clearly shows the boundaries of the East German industrial espionage. Thus, the GDR purchase although obscured by 1970 some 12 IBM computers and it was also from 1973 80-100 computer to produce itself, Macrakis, but not nearly reached its computer industry the importance of even small Western states, and remained until the last uncatchable back years behind the western stand. Apparently even have the sizes of the Stasi tried to avoid the PR activities of the political leadership to sell the results obtained by espionage knowledge as a personal contribution - at least maintains the Werner Grossmann, the last head of East German intelligence.
Leipziger Messe: City of countless initiations
indicator of economic espionage in the GDR
first The industrial espionage has - like the rest of espionage - put great continuity and patience on the day and, for example in the 50's agent smuggled into the Federal Republic, which until the 80s were active, or Students recruited and encouraged young people to relevant studies to them years later to use part of a decade in positions with insights into relevant topics. About 5 percent of the agents was in use since the 50s, half were longer than 10 years active.
second The spy could take, despite its apparently accurate picture of the situation of the Federal Republic and the West as a whole, neither the political leadership, the fear of a preemptive strike of the West, nor eliminate the misconception that the catch up with economic backwardness of non-market conditions such as Dörrenberg be emphasized.
third The spy of the GDR could gain despite successful procurement of information and goods embargo no successful computer industry. For this purpose, neither the economic situation of the GDR was likely still in the industry of the situation. On the contrary seems to be the absence of competition in addition to the have prevented foreclosure by the West and their own repressive system, that information could be used successfully.
4. The HV A apparently suffered despite the narrowness of its technical resources in an information overload, that even with the large number of committed scientists and other experts was not controllable.
5th It can scarcely be estimated, which sum due to the GDR industrial espionage saved (development costs) and was taken (by his own industry sales) and what caused the success. In addition to personnel costs and other costs would also have the cost of procurement will be added to embargo of goods (especially since the purchases made in foreign currency). The insistence on the goal of wanting to self-produce computer and successful refractive embargo has ultimately caused a bottomless pit, in the foreign exchange disappeared. Thus, the illegal procurement of technology helped usher in the end of the GDR, Buth.
6th Apparently, in the economic field there are no active measures have been carried out, that is deception on a larger scale (eg on the economic situation of the GDR), sabotage against West German companies and industries (eg, using the initiation or promotion of critical non-governmental organizations) or attacks on the West German economy Total (for example, the German currency Mark, the German capital market or the image of "Made in West Germany").
7th Obviously playing in the East breaking the embargo and the reconstruction of Western products an essential role in economic espionage.
lessons of the industrial espionage of the GDR
first It can be assumed that industrial espionage from other countries today but may not have the continuity of the GDR, but at least takes a medium-term perspective and therefore already interns, undergraduates and graduate students can be introduced deliberately. Furthermore, may still be trying to get candidates on the long detour of a few relevant point in an interesting target position.
second Access to information and even their correct evaluation does not necessarily mean that the political and economic decision-makers to either a filtered) and interpreted or manipulated results are obtained, or b) interpreted this wrong due to their own setting.
third The economic situation and the state of the industry is crucial to the usability of information and analysis. is in fact in other states and their economies and business innovations that are appropriate only where there are between invention and exploitation, that is, production short distances. Even with excellent information gathering and analysis, the success on it, these results also incorporate beneficial to the recipient. If states, sectors of a country or company is not technically "on par" with the counterparts are the target country, it will be difficult for them to benefit from economic espionage. This should not in many projects in third world countries or emerging economies is not the case. If these states educate their domestic industries through economic espionage to dependence on pulses from the outside, Innovations despite saving development time and costs of information and may be delayed for pirated technology is neither service nor spare parts by time delay in the procurement are possible, they may weaken rather than strengthen.
4th Although the GDR obviously primarily on human intelligence supported it suffered from too much information. Today is used in all relevant intelligence extensive signals intelligence added. The danger of information overload is therefore even greater, while the number of such staff is not upgradable to the same extent as in East Germany was possible. At the same time many of the services of third world and emerging countries are also engaged in extensive repression against its own citizens at home and abroad.
5th The way in the struggle, some third world countries and emerging markets with industrial projects - particularly in the defense sector - similar to the behavior of the GDR (as in the case of computer industry). Just as it is questionable in some of the sense of the cost savings and the image and loss of confidence in the spying States.
6th The idea of active measures is not as strange as it seems at first glance. While it is for a state, the primary interest in attracting and use of information from another is counter-productive, this damage to be done. But in the face of international conflicts with boycotts and attacks on infrastructure are not looking for active measures by the hand of opportunity.
7th The reverse engineering, the reconstruction of, for example by breaking embargo derived products, is now the world - for example on a larger scale in Asia - more common, as for the wedding of the GDR. This is likely next to the replica of arms is one of the greatest future threats to other industries are located (eg state-sponsored generic industry, that is, strategic production of generic products).
references
war in the dark. Disinformation and awareness of national security
Psychological Warfare in Hörfung: World War II and the Cold War
literature
- R. Buth: The organizational structure for the purchase of Western technology in the field of microelectronics. In: G. Herbstritt and H. Müller-Enbergs (eds): The face to the West. East German espionage against the Federal Republic of Germany. Bremen 2003rd
- D. Dörrenberg: evidence of the secret work of the Stasi to the West. In: Herbers and Müller-Enbergs 2003rd
- H. Eltgen: No chance. Memories of an HV-A officer. Berlin 1995th
- W. Grossman: Bonn in mind. The East German intelligence from the perspective of their last boss. Berlin 2001.
- K. Macrakis: Performs effective espionage to success in science and technology? In: Herbers and Müller-Enbergs 2003rd
- H. Müller-Enbergs: What we know about the East German intelligence? In: Herbers and Müller-Enbergs 2003rd
0 comments:
Post a Comment